Schemes

What each widely used scheme rests on, what it costs, and where it stands against classical and quantum attacks. Schemes with a full page are linked from their entry; most of those pages carry a worked example that is computed, and checked against the standard's test vectors where there are any, every time the site is built. The rest are summarised here, with links to the attacks that set their parameters.

At a glance

"Broken by Shor's algorithm" means broken by a large fault-tolerant quantum computer, which does not exist yet. It is the reason for the move away from RSA and elliptic curves, and the reason key exchange moves first: traffic recorded today can be decrypted later, while a signature only has to resist forgery for as long as it is relied on.

SchemeKindRests onAgainst a quantum computer
ECDH (X25519, P-256)Key establishmentElliptic-curve discrete logarithmBroken by Shor's algorithm
Finite-field Diffie–HellmanKey establishmentDiscrete logarithm in Fp×Broken by Shor's algorithm
ML-KEMKey establishmentModule learning with errorsNo known efficient attack
HQCKey establishmentDecoding quasi-cyclic codesNo known efficient attack
Classic McElieceKey establishmentDecoding binary Goppa codesNo known efficient attack
CSIDHKey establishmentInverting a class-group actionSubexponential attack (Kuperberg)
RSASignature and encryptionFactoringBroken by Shor's algorithm
ECDSASignatureElliptic-curve discrete logarithmBroken by Shor's algorithm
EdDSA (Ed25519, Ed448)SignatureElliptic-curve discrete logarithmBroken by Shor's algorithm
Schnorr signatures (BIP-340)SignatureElliptic-curve discrete logarithmBroken by Shor's algorithm
BLS signaturesSignatureDiffie–Hellman in pairing groupsBroken by Shor's algorithm
ML-DSASignatureModule-LWE and module-SISNo known efficient attack
FN-DSA (Falcon)SignatureShort vectors in NTRU latticesNo known efficient attack
SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+)SignatureHash functions onlyNo known efficient attack
LMS and XMSSSignatureHash functions onlyNo known efficient attack
SQIsignSignatureSupersingular endomorphism ringsNo known efficient attack
AESBlock cipherResistance to cryptanalysisKey search sped up by Grover, not broken
ChaCha20-Poly1305Authenticated cipherResistance to cryptanalysisKey search sped up by Grover, not broken
SHA-2Hash functionResistance to cryptanalysisGeneric speedups only
SHA-3 and SHAKEHash functionResistance to cryptanalysisGeneric speedups only
SIKEKey establishmentIsogenies with torsion imagesBroken classically
RainbowSignatureMultivariate quadratic equationsBroken classically
DSASignatureDiscrete logarithm in Fp×Broken by Shor's algorithm
SHA-1Hash functionResistance to cryptanalysisBroken classically
MD5Hash functionResistance to cryptanalysisBroken classically
DES and Triple DESBlock cipherResistance to cryptanalysisBroken classically
RC4Stream cipherResistance to cryptanalysisBroken classically

Key establishment

How two parties agree on a shared secret over a public channel: Diffie–Hellman key exchange, or a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), in which one side encrypts a fresh key to the other's public key.

Signatures

How a message is bound to a key, so that anyone with the public key can check it. Post-quantum signatures cost more bytes than the schemes they replace, by very different amounts:

1001,00010,000bytes, log scalepublic keysignatureEd25519Ed25519: public key 32 bytesEd25519: signature 64 bytesECDSA P-256ECDSA P-256: public key 33 bytesECDSA P-256: signature 64 bytesSQIsign ISQIsign I: public key 83 bytesSQIsign I: signature 200 bytesRSA-3072RSA-3072: public key 384 bytesRSA-3072: signature 384 bytesFN-DSA-512FN-DSA-512: public key 897 bytesFN-DSA-512: signature 666 bytesML-DSA-44ML-DSA-44: public key 1,312 bytesML-DSA-44: signature 2,420 bytesSLH-DSA-128sSLH-DSA-128s: public key 32 bytesSLH-DSA-128s: signature 7,856 bytesSLH-DSA-128fSLH-DSA-128f: public key 32 bytesSLH-DSA-128f: signature 17,088 bytes
Public key and signature sizes at the lowest standard security level of each scheme. SQIsign is at its round-3 parameters (version 3.0, September 2026); the ECDSA public key is compressed and its signature is the raw pair (r, s).
The values plotted above.
SchemePublic key (bytes)Signature (bytes)Standard or status
Ed255193264RFC 8032, FIPS 186-5
ECDSA P-2563364FIPS 186-5
SQIsign I83200NIST round 3 candidate
RSA-3072384384RFC 8017, FIPS 186-5
FN-DSA-512897666FIPS 206 in preparation
ML-DSA-441,3122,420FIPS 204
SLH-DSA-128s327,856FIPS 205
SLH-DSA-128f3217,088FIPS 205

Symmetric ciphers and hashes

Schemes with no public key. They carry the bulk of the data once a key is agreed, and quantum computers threaten them far less: Grover's algorithm at most square-roots the cost of a key search, and parallelises badly.

Broken or retired

Schemes that fell, and what finally ended them. Most of these failures were visible years before they became practical.